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This study analyzes whether the retirement reform proposal of the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) provides more or less value for service members than the current 
retirement system. With the increase of government spending and discretionary 
government spending suffering heavy cuts, exploring ways to reduce government 
spending has become increasingly important. The single highest entity of discretionary 
spending is the allocation of military funds, and military compensation is a significant 
element of the military budget. 
The present value formula was used to determine the value added by OSD’s 
retirement reform proposal and the current retirement system. Factoring the concept of 
time value of money, OSD’s proposal increases the service members’ value of the 
retirement benefit. Next, comparisons were made to find the promotion and retention 
incentives associated with OSD’s proposal and the impact on service members. When 
comparing an O–5 and O–6, the opportunity cost of not making the higher rank of O–6 
can be significant. The data also show the limited incentives for service members to 
progress in their career or continue service at the same rank when close to retirement. 
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The government has increased mandatory spending significantly. The growth in 
the overall mandatory spending allocation is the reason spending has risen in past years. 
With trillion dollar federal deficits accrued from 2009–2012, and a 680 billion deficit in 
2013, discretionary spending has suffered significant cuts (Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), 2007). The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is aware that the military 
will continue to face cuts and has been looking for ways to revamp military retirement 
benefits. According to the 2011 Defense Business Board (DBB) report, the current 
military system is “unsustainable” (Defense Business Board Task Group, 2011, p. 5). 
One of the government’s focuses has been the OSD proposal, given in the Tenth 
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QMRC). 
The Tenth QMRC proposal involves defined benefits, contribution plan, gate pay 
and separation pay. These are further explained: 
 A defined benefit plan provides retirement pay equal to a 2.5 percent 
multiplier of the High-3. The benefit would be payable at age 57. 
 A defined contribution plan under which DOD (Department Of Defense) 
would annually contribute up to 5 percent of basic pay. 
 Gate pay is a continuation payment payable at specified year-of-service 
milestones. 
 Separation pay is provided to members when they leave the military 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness [USD 
(P&R)], 2008).   
In 2012, Naval Postgraduate School was tasked to study alternatives developed by 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), showing that this issue is relevant to current 
times. With 83 percent of service members not reaching the 20-year minimum 
requirement for retirement, cutting cost and exploring multiple options to provide service 
members with retirement is a pertinent issue (Defense Business Board Task Group, 2011, 
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p. 26). This thesis will examine how variations in years of service (YOS) and rank, based 
on the Tenth QMRC proposal, can impact service members financially. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to model variations in present values (PVs) for 
service members ranks O–5 to O–10 when implementing OSD’s proposal and comparing 
the plan with the current military retiree program. The model variables are YOS and rank, 
and they will show the impact they have in respect to PV. After assessing the best 
retirement option, further investigation of incentives for retention and promotion will be 
explored. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary question that this thesis addresses: Which retirement policy 
provides more benefit for service members, OSD’s proposal or the current 
retirement policy? 
The following secondary questions will be addressed: 
 How monetarily significant is the retirement policy for service members 
with the same rank but different YOS? 
 How monetarily significant is the retirement policy for service members 
with the different rank but the same YOS? 
 Are there any monetary incentives for service members to remain 
commissioned for an extended period? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
OSD’s proposal provided the options for the simulation model, and choices were 
based on these options. The officer community was chosen because it was the highest 
paid category, and it allowed for a base case. Life expectancy was based on male officers, 
since the majority of officers are male. Data for life expectancies were extrapolated from 
the DOD Office of the Actuary Life Expectancy Rate. This rate was used to calculate the 
length of annuity payments based on expected year of death.  
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Results are limited to an aggregated perspective of service members in the male 
officer community. The assumption is that all changes in this model would have a similar 
effect on the military as a whole. Assumptions were also made that with the transition to 
a smaller force being our nation focus; DOD retention issues will average into a normal 
curve over time. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Methodology for this research is to calculate the PV with variation in YOS and 
rank based on the 2008 OSD military retirement plan proposal. The model assumes that 
an officer is following the generic career progression. The discount rate was arbitrarily 
selected based on empirical data ranges of 10 to 15 percent. The rate will remain static. 
This adds assurance that the component will not affect possible PV values unless 
changed. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH 
Chapter II addresses the U.S. military compensation, purpose of the retirement 
system, history of retirement policies, the current system, and the OSD proposal. 
Chapter III gives a model description and discusses methodology and 
implementation of methods. This chapter will provide a more in-depth description of the 
PV and the assumptions made to construct the model. 
Chapter IV analyzes how the variations within the military retirement policy 
impacts incentives for service members. This chapter dives into the results of the 
analytical approach taken to answer primary and secondary questions. 
Chapter V makes conclusions and recommendations based on analyses of output 
from the model. 
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II. SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTATION AND CURRENT 
MILITARY COMPENSATION 
A. MILITARY COMPENSATION 
Before diving into current options and possible variations of the military 
retirement program, understanding the military compensation system is vital. The 
military compensation system is a mix of non-cash incentives, cash payments, and 
retirement benefits. The six major components of military compensation are: 
 Basic Pay: Based on rank and service, taxable wage disbursed to all 
service members 
 Allowances: Nontaxable income, disbursed in the form of food and 
housing 
 Special Pay/Bonus: Compensation for difficult or dangerous duty, taxable 
income 
 Tax advantages: Tax advantage options available in certain regions are 
tax exempt; certain residencies allow for more advantageous tax options; 
and there are multiple military services associated with tax advantages 
 Non-cash Benefits: Miscellaneous benefits (i.e., Commissary, fuel 
stations, health care) 
 Retirement Benefits: Retirement compensation in the current retirement 
system is a defined-benefit plan after a minimum of 20 years of service 
(Defense Business Board Task Group, 2011, p. 29). 
The Regular Military Compensation (RMC) calculator adds up basic pay, 
allowances, and tax saving options to provide annual income in comparison with the 
civilian sector. In 2000, based on the RMC, the military was placed in the upper 70 
percentile of civilian pay in comparison to age and education level (Hosek, Asch, & 
Mattock, 2012, p. 34). The chart in Figure 1 shows the constant rise in pay percentile 
based on age and education from 2000–2009. With the rise in pay percentile, the military 




Figure 1.  Income Percentile for Military Personnel with Similar Age and 
Education (from Hosek, Asch, and Mattock, 2012, p. 33) 
B. PURPOSE OF MILITARY RETIREMENT 
The two main purposes of the military retirement system are to provide adequate 
military compensation after service and incentives for military members to retire. The 
compensation focus is to entice, retain, and inspire all service members to continue to 
strive for professional progression. To maintain proficient armed forces, the government 
prefers that service members willingly retire. This allows the following personnel to add 
their values to their perspective services. After an optimal time for service has been 
served, the following quote shows the importance of retirement: 
A sound retirement system is essential to solving the superannuation 
problem. The services must be kept young, vigorous, and efficient: a 
sound retirement plan with a proper compulsory retirement age will permit 
youth and brains to rise to the top in time to be effective…. Other concepts 
of retirement for those taking up the profession of arms are also important 
and have been taken into consideration but the Commission does not 
consider them to be controlling. (Advisory Commission on Service Pay, 
1948, p. 40)  
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C. HISTORY OF RETIREMENT POLICIES 
Understanding the history of the military retirement system will help the reader 
understand why the system was created and how it has changed. It will also help discover 
the focus of the current program. The birth of military pension can be found as early at 
1636 in the war between the Pilgrims of Plymouth Colony and Pequot Indians (Glasson, 
1900, p. 12). The law of the land stated that any soldier maimed during the war would be 
compensated by the colony for the rest of his life (Glasson, 1900, p. 13). By 1776, this 
same concept was written into law shortly after Declaration of Independence: Fifty 
percent pay would be allotted to all disabled service members (Glasson, 1900, p. 12). 
There were several legislative acts that have shaped our current system. 
Addressing those that created an impetus in changing our current military retirement 
program is the primary focus. By understanding the impact these acts had, the reader is 
able to gain insight on challenges for the future as well as recommendations to move 
forward. 
 The Current System of Vesting: In 1946, the 20 YOS marks for Navy 
and Marine Corps officers were established. In 1948, this was established 
for officers of the Army and Air Force (Christian, 2006, p. 22). 
 National Defense Authorization Act of 1981: This Act terminated the 
old system where service members received retirement annuity based on 
final pay. It was replaced by the current High-3 method. This method 
takes the average of the service member’s highest three years of service to 
calculate retirement annuity. The pay is then multiplied by the multiplier 
of 2.5 percent accrued for 20+ years of service (Christian, 2006, p. 20). 
 Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986: On July 31, 1986, Congress 
passed the Military Retirement Reform Act (MRRA), commonly referred 
to as the “REDUX.” It used the 5th QRMC’s recommendation and 
adjusted the multiplier from 2.5 to 2.0 percent. The concept is to offer 40 
percent of annuity at the 20-year mark, with an increase in the multiplier 
to 3.5 percent after year 20 and a $30,000 bonus at the 15-year mark. Cost 
of Living Adjustments were also targeted in this plan (COLA) (Christian, 
2006, p. 21). 
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D. CURRENT RETIREMENT POLICY 
There are two distinct military retirement plans in effect: non-disability and 
disability retirement pay. They are highly correlated, but the focus of this thesis is to 
address non-disability pension options. The three non-disability retirement plans that will 
be discussed are: Final Pay, High-3, and the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 
(REDUX). Every plan is calculated by a 20-year vesting period and has the same payout 
formula: (Retired Pay Base * Multiplier percent). 
1. Final Pay Plan 
Final Pay Plan is the retirement payment formula for service members who 
entered the service before September 8, 1980(USD [P&R], n.d.a). This plan is only 
applicable for service members who have 34+ YOS. Naturally, over time the percentage 
of applicable members diminishes. Each year of service is worth 2.5 percent towards the 
multiplier, but the retired base pay is factored on the final year of service pay. Again, 
with a diminishing group in this category, this thesis will not address this option as a 
viable threat to any possible changes in the future. 
2. High-3 Plan 
All service members entering the service after September 8, 1980, fall under the 
High-3 Plan (USD [P&R], n.d.a). The difference between the two policies is that instead 
of taking the final month of base pay as the retired base, it is now a mathematical average 
of the final three years of service. Since the last year is usually the highest income point, 
by taking the average it reduced the overall compensation given to service members. 
Under High-3, as well as the Final Pay Plan, retirement pay is protected from 
inflation by annual Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) (USD [P&R], n.d.b). The 
Consumer Price Index, as measured by the Department of Labor, is used to determine the 
annual COLA changes. The annual COLA is equal to the percentage increase in the CPI 
for each year. This is a different index than what is used for active duty annual pay raises. 
Those are based upon average civilian wage increases. Thus, retirement pay COLAs and 
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annual active duty pay raises will differ (Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel & 
Readiness, 2011). 
3. REDUX (Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986) 
The REDUX program is applicable to service members who joined after August 
1, 1986. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2000, however, gave individuals the 
option to choose between REDUX and High-3. One of the major elements of the 
REDUX plan is the disbursement of $30,000 Career Status Bonus at the 15-year mark 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel & Readiness, 2011). This obligates 
the individual to serve until the minimum retirement time of 20 years. The reason behind 
the implementation of the REDUX policy is that as individuals extend past 20 years, the 
percentage multiplier increases to 3.5 percent (USD [P&R], n.d.a). This mitigates the 
high attrition after the 20-year mark. 
The REDUX and High-3 retired base pay plans are calculated in the same way, 
based on the average base pay of the highest three years of service. Additionally, the 
REDUX COLA is also targeted in the Military Retirement Reform Act (MRRA). If the 
percent determined above is greater than 1 percent, the COLA for REDUX retirements 
will be reduced by 1 percent (USD [P&R], n.d.b). If the percent determined above is 1 
percent or less, the COLA for the REDUX retirement plan will be the same as all other 
retirement plans (USD [P&R], n.d.b). Table 1 provides a visual of the REDUX system: 
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Table 1.   Chart Multiplier Comparison 
E. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TENTH QUADRENNIAL 
REVIEW OF MILITARY COMPENSATION POLICY 
The goal of providing more flexibility for service members’ careers was 
attempted in the tenth QMRC’s new proposal for the current retirement system. The 
foundation for this proposal is the combination of the defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans. The next discussion dives deeper the plan’s specifics and the 
components that constitute possible reform for the future. 
1. Defined Benefit Plan 
The defined benefit would provide qualified members with retirement pay equal 
to 2.5 percent of High-3 annual basic pay multiplied by the number of years of service. 
(USD[P&R], 2008). The plan would vest at 10 years of service, changing the current 20-
year structure and allowing the force to be eligible for an earlier defined retirement 
benefit (USD[P&R], 2008). This benefit would be payable beginning at age 60 for those 
with less than 20 years of service and for those at age 57 with 20 or more years of 
service. If a service member served a minimum of 20 years, that member could receive 
an annuity upon separation of the military, but five percentage points will reduce 
payments for each year the member is short of age 57 (USD[P&R], 2008). 
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2. Defined Contribution Plan 
(USD[P&R], 2008) reported under the defined contribution plan, the designated 
branch would annually contribute up to 5 percent of annual basic pay into a retirement 
account for each service member. The plan would vest at 10 years of service and begin 
paying out at age 60. Contribution rates will vary based on years of service, with a 
maximum rate of 5 percent for those members with five or more years of service. The 
breakdown is as follows: the contribution rate would equal zero percent of annual basic 
pay for those with less than a year of service; 2 percent for members with up to two years 
of service; 3 percent for those with more than two but less than four years of service; 4 
percent for personnel with four but less than five years of service; and 5 percent for those 
with five or more years of service (USD[P&R], 2008).  
3. Gate Pay 
Gate pays are compensations paid to members who reach specified years-of-
service milestones during their career progressions. Calculations are based off of basic 
pay, and these payments would be made regardless of whether a member remains in 
service after reaching the specified year of service necessary to qualify for the pay. Each 
Service has different times and amounts allocated for their respective service members 
(USD[P&R], 2008).  
4. Separation Pay 
This pay would equal monthly basic pay multiplied by years of service and a 
multiplier. This would be provided to qualifying members when they leave the military. 
The concept is to ease the transition from the military and, hopefully, provide a buffer for 
the possibility of unemployment (USD[P&R], 2008). 
F. SUMMARY 
Maturation of the current retirement system had a metamorphic impact and it is 
now used as a tool to retain vital personnel, control the size of the force, and to provide 
fiscal stability for retired personnel. With the economic downfalls that have hit our 
economy, service members are deciding to stay in longer, which increases the Military 
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Retirement Fund (MRF) liability (Defense Business Board Task Group, 2011, p. 27). 
This, combined with the increase of life expectancy from early 60s to roughly the early 
80s, is another aspect causing cost growth in the DOD retirement liability. The current 
system was designed in an era when life spans were shorter, second careers were less 
common, and skills were not as easily transferrable to private sector opportunities. 
With growing national debt and increased deficit spending by the federal 
government, the DOD has received high criticism regarding the current military 
retirement system. In 2013, defense spending was four percent of GDP and is predicted to 
head towards a downward trend (Boccia, Fraser, & Goff, 2013). With 2013 GDP at 
15684.8 (billions), four percent is a significant number (Trending Economics, n.d.). With 
approximately 83 percent of the service members not reaching 20 years, leaving that 
group with no retirement options is unfair (Defense Business Board Task Group, 2011, p. 
26). With financial constraints expected to be our future way of life, change is inevitable. 
This thesis will explore how variations in YOS and rank effect the retirement 
compensation of our service members.  
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III. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
This model simulated the potential income for an active-duty male military officer 
based on the Tenth QRMC proposal. The primary focus is both on the annuity and 
separation pay aspects. Annuity fluctuated based on two aspects: YOS and career 
progression (rank). The model used the data from the 2014 military pay chart to 
accurately predict annuity received by military officer at the age of 57 based on rank and 
YOS. 
The base case scenarios chosen calculated the PV for all possible annuity 
disbursements and separation pay. The focus was from 57 years old to the expected year 
of death. All the data for annuity payments were based on the DOD Office of the Actuary 
Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System Fiscal Year 2013. 
A. MILITARY PAY CHART 
In Table 2, the Defense Financial and Accounting Service (DFAS) provided, in 
accordance with rank and YOS, the salary database of the 2014 per-month salaries. The 
light blue section ranging from 18–25 represents the numbers of years a service member 
served. The light grey sections depict the grade and rank of the officers. For example, an 
O–7 with 25 YOS would collect $12,043.80 each month while on active duty. 
Modifications to the categories were made to show each year of service instead of the 
standard two-year interval. Because the primary focus of this model is within the ranks of 
O–5 to O–10, the blacked out portions represent options that are not applicable. 
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Table 2.   Pay Chart (from Defense Finance and Accounting Service, n.d.) 
B. HIGH-3 PAYOUT TABLE 
The data collected from the DFAS monthly salaries’ information were used as a 
base to construct possible payouts of annuity. In Table 3, each designated YOS and rank 
category took the average of the prior two years monthly salaries and the current year 
monthly salary and then multiplied by 12 to establish a yearly salary. The total was then 
divided by three to calculate the annual average for the three years. Lastly, the cumulative 
multiplier was used in the multiplication of the High-3 annual annuity to help calculate 
the percentage disbursed to service members. For example, in Table 3 the rank of an O–6 
at 22 YOS would collect $64,083.36 in annual annuity payments. The cumulative 
multiplier was based on the traditional 2.5 percent for every year of service. This 
information was then placed in its respective year to represent the possible payouts at a 
certain YOS and rank. Information on estimated age of retirement and estimated life 
expectancy based on DOD actuary statistics was added. This information was used as a 
base to establish annuity length and age of service member at the time of retirement. It 
also allowed the determination of payments based on the current policy. 
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Table 3.   High-3 Payout Table 
C. OUTPUT INFORMATION 
In respect to the output information, the DOD Office of the Actuary Statistical 
Report on retiree by rank and YOS were used to make an educated assumption on the 
possible YOS and rank correlation. Table 4 helps exhibit this on a visual level, displaying 
what an O–6 would mostly like be making at 21 YOS, collecting $59,704.47 in annual 
annuity payments. Based on time in service and rank, some YOS were not applicable. For 
example, O–5 and O–6 possible payout ceases at YOS 28 and 30, respectively. This is 
due to higher tenure. Further, the ranks from O–7 to O–10 continued to 35 YOS. The 
earliest a service member retired in his respective rank established a premise for the first 
possible promotion in a respective rank.  
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Table 4.   High-3 Applicable Payout Table 
D. EXPECTED ANNUITY 
Table 5 takes the estimated YOS and rank, pulls the applicable information from 
the High-3 YOS chart, and outputs the possible annuity payments. Thirty YOS as an 
officer at the rank of O–6 would make $96,324.30 in annual annuity payments for 27 
years, clearing $765,060.91 before taxes at a 12 percent discount rate. Being able to 
gather this data allows for researchers to account for variations in service member 
promotions based on their YOS. It also allows the researcher the ability to explore a 
multitude of payout possibilities based on the Tenth QMRC proposal. 
 
Table 5.   Expected Annuity Table 
E. PRESENT VALUE 
The model then took the expected years of annuity based on year one and 
calculated the present value. Present values are all based on a 12 percent discount rate. 
Since annuities will begin at age 57 to expected years until death, this was the basis for 
the number of annuity payments. Inflation and taxes were calculated to allow for more 
analysis, but they were not included when calculating present values for each rank. Table 
6 shows an example of applicable information used to calculate PV. 
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For aesthetic reasons, Table 7 consolidates the information listed in Table 6. The 
divisions are based on a static rank. This allows multiple rank structures and provides the 
ability to compare different ranks. Table 7 has a YOS section with a pull down option to 
calculate variations in YOS. It will also allow variations in PV. 
 
Table 6.   Present Value Table 
 
Table 7.   Consolidated Output 
F. ASSUMPTIONS 
Several assumptions made in construction of this model were discussed briefly 
throughout this chapter. In this section, all assumptions will be consolidated and 
addressed to enhance clarity. First, the discount rate of 12 percent was chosen based on 
aggregated findings. There were also assumptions made on the combinations of the most 
likely YOS and rank based on information given in respect of YOS and retirement. By 
looking at the highest numbers of retirees in a YOS and rank category, the assumption 
that a majority of service members reach that specific combination was deduced. Another 
major assumption was that all service members will live out their lives to their expected 
years of death (based on DOD’s Office of the Actuary Statistical Report on the military 
retirement system estimates). This allowed for a standardized annuity formulation. 
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Annuity at age 57 was based on the OSD proposal that service members will receive 
annuities at the age of 57 after 20 YOS. Table 5 exhibits the possible options for High-3 
possible payouts. The assumption was made that YOS and rank for newly retired service 
members would correlate with the rank of service members at a particular YOS and rank. 
Lastly, as mentioned earlier in Chapter I, there was a basic assumption that the officers 
commissioning age is 23 years old. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an analysis and evaluation to ascertain if service members 
financially benefit or come up short with the implementation of OSD’s proposal. There 
also is an underlying assessment of any significant correlation between retention and the 
incentives the proposal offers. The results were determined through the analysis of 
present value possibilities in various simulated occurrences in accordance with OSD’s 
proposal. 
B. OSD VERSUS HIGH-3 (CURRENT) 
Table 8 exhibits OSD’s proposal for an O–5 with 20 YOS. Assuming service 
members are commissioned at 23 years old, the person is now 43 at age of retirement. 
Next is age 57, which is the applicable age for annuity payments. Based on the statistical 
report on the military retirement system (DOD Office of the Actuary, May 1, 2013), a 
service member at 43 years old has 27 years of annuity payments before estimated death. 
The average range for discount rates was between 10–15 percent (a 12 percent discount 
rate was used as the base case). 
 
Table 8.   Present Value Inputs (OSD) 
Table 9 shows the annual income during the first year. The income was 
extrapolated from the High-3 payout chart for annuity payouts based on rank and YOS. A 
common scenario of a retired O–5 at 20 YOS was analyzed to ascertain if OSD’s 
proposal provides financial gain for service members. Table 10 used the same format for 
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PV inputs as Table 8. Due to earlier age qualifications in the current retirement system, 
the only difference is that annuities increased. 
 
Table 9.   Annual Income  
 
Table 10.   Present Value Inputs (Current) 
Table 11 outputs show the PV both under OSD’s proposal and under the current 
retirement policy. In implementing OSD’s proposal, the PV for an O–5 at 20 YOS was 
approximately $394,281.06. This compares with $409,710.59 under the current 
retirement system. The OSD proposal adds separation pay to offset the loss in income by 
receiving annuities at a later age in life. 
 
Table 11.   PV Comparison, O-5 at 20 YOS 
Figure 2 gives a snapshot of the formula created by OSD to calculate the one-time 
lump sum separation pay. Calculating separation pay in addition to annuity changes the 
dynamics of who is better or worse off financially. Evaluating the monetary difference in 
the case scenario of an O–5 at 20 YOS, per Table 11, the loss in annuity under OSD’s 
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new proposal is $(15,429.53). Compare this to the separation pay of an O–5 at 20 YOS at 
$24,820.80. With the OSD’s new proposal, there is a loss of $(9,391.27). The separation 
pay is calculated by multiplying the annuity of $49,641.60 by the 20 YOS and the 2.5 
percent multiplier calculated separation pay. The service member receives an additional 
$9,391.27. 
Separation Pay = Expected Annuity*YOS*Multiplier 
Figure 2.  Separation Pay Formula 
C. PROPOSAL COMPARISONS 
The High-3 offers higher annuity payments. Thus, it initially looks like a better 
option compared to OSD’s proposal. Again, time-value of money plays a huge role in 
understanding the best option available. Based on rank and YOS, Table 12 compares the 
PV of OSD’s proposal with the current retirement system. For example, the table takes 
the rank of an O–5 with 20 YOS and calculates the PV for the OSD’s proposal and the 
current system. Next, it takes the difference of the two, which is $(15,429.53), and adds 
the assigned separation pay from the OSD proposal for a net gain of $9,391.27. The YOS 
in the table are based on the DOD Office of the Actuary Statistical Report on retiree by 
rank and YOS. The concept was that the YOS with the most retirees would be the most 
common rank at that YOS. Lastly, the table looked at the break-even discount rate that 
would allow the OSD proposal to equal the current High-3 retirement policy. To equal 
the High-3 PV of an O-5 at 20 YOS, OSD’s proposal needed a discount rate of 11.471%, 
only requiring a slight variation in the discount rate. The difference in discount rates 
diminished as YOS increased, until 12% provided the same value in the current High-3 
retirement policy as it did under OSD’s proposal. 
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Table 12.   Comparison Chart of OSD and Current Retirement System 
Based on the first scenario of an O–5 at 20 YOS, OSD’s proposal is more 
favorable. This proposal continues to increase in favorability because of a smaller time-
lapse between retirement and annuity age. With less time between retirement and the 
annuity payment under the OSD proposal, the PV difference between the two policies 
decreases. Separation pay, however, increases as service members’ YOS and ranks 
progress. This provides service members with a higher overall payout under the OSD 
proposal relative to the current system, i.e., this gives service members a significant lump 
sum up front. Separation pay, combined with closing the annuity time gap, allows OSD 
to provide a more valuable option to retiring service members as rank and YOS increase. 
D. SAME RANK WITH DIFFERENT YOS 
Table 13 illustrates the results of the PV analysis for the OSD proposal with 
similar ranks but different YOS. For example, the table takes the rank of an O–6 and 
compares PV in at 25 and 30 YOS. Thus, the present values equal $598,622.31 and 
$765,060.91, respectively. Generally, as rank increases in the comparisons, there was 
also an increase in financial loss between the different YOS. The highest two ranks were 




Table 13.   Difference in YOS Compared to Similar Rank 
E. DIFFERENT RANKS WITH SAME YOS 
The comparison of different ranks with the same YOS drove the question of 
whether there is financial incentive to strive to achieve a higher rank. Or should a service 
member be content at the same pay grade upon retirement? At the 34/35 YOS mark, 
high-income disparities resulted because of the high amount of base pay service members 
received. At this stage in the evaluation and analysis, the only applicable ranks were O–7 
through O–10. These ranks produced the highest yearly payments in the U.S. military pay 
structure. Table 14 shows the PV of the OSD retirement plan for the two different ranks, 
O–7 and O–8 ($1,005,610.42 and $1,148,767.61, respectively). This resulted in a 
difference in PV of $(143,157.19) or 14 percent. 
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Table 14.   Rank difference with 34 YOS (OSD) 
Analysis revealed an anomaly. This was discovered when comparing an O–5 and 
an O–6. Excluding YOS 34/35, the largest percentage disparity in annuity between single 
rank separations was O–5 and O–6. Table 15 is set up in the same format as Table 14 and 
shows the PV difference of an O–5 and an O–6 after 28 YOS under OSD’s proposal and 
the percentage difference. At 28 YOS, an O–5 is considered high tenure and will be 
forced to retire. An O–6 at 28 YOS still has another two years before reaching high 
tenure status. Comparing a terminal O–5 to an O–6 with the opportunity to continue with 
career progression, how strong is the career and financial incentive to make O–6? 
 
Table 15.   Rank difference with 28 YOS 
The PV for an O–5 at 28 YOS is estimated at $578,820.58, while the PV for an 
O–6 is estimated at $709,339.92. This is a difference of $(130,519.35) or a 22.5 percent 
loss. The loss of income difference is not seen again until 33 YOS. Comparing an O–7 
and an O–8 at 33 YOS, the possible lost annuity is $(129,737.85) or a 13 percent loss of 
income. All other comparisons held constant percentage differences of about 13–16 
percent loss of income, except for year 28 for an O–5 and an O–6. The size of financial 
loss and the lower present value of annuity drastically impacts service members at the 28-
YOS mark. 
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F. INCENTIVES FOR LONGER COMMISSIONS 
Table 16 explores the opportunity cost of an O–6 retiring prior to the next 
available YOS. The table indicates the two YOS being compared (e.g., 21 YOS and 22 
YOS), calculates the monetary difference between the two OSD retirement plan PVs, and 
follows with the percentage difference based on the earlier year. For example, an O–6 
retiring after 23 YOS would receive $(33,047.06) less than if retiring after 24 YOS. This 
is 6 percent less than continuing military service for another year. This table closely 
mirrors percentages in the other ranks as well and implies that service members receive a 
small percentage increase in retirement benefits (~5 percent/year) for longer military 
service if they remain at the same rank. The percentage incentive does not put much 
emphasis on prolonged career enhancement without the prospect for promotion. This 
raises the question whether this is the message we want to send our troops in the wake of 
the forward transition to a smaller, more capable force. 
 
Table 16.   Percentage Changes in Opportunity Cost 
G. SUMMARY 
Within this chapter, PV is used to analyze the financial impact on service 
members comparing OSD’s proposal and the current retirement system. The first analysis 
addressed which option provides the most value for service members. It may not be 
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obvious, but service members receive greater value under OSD’s proposal. Applying the 
concept of the time-value of money, service members receive greater monetary value 
with the combined annuity payments and separation pay under the OSD proposal than 
they do with the more generous annuity payments in the current system. 
The analysis then addressed the financial significance between service members 
with the same rank and different YOS. Analysis showed a simple pattern: as YOS 
increases, there is an increase in the financial difference. When analyzing different ranks 
with similar YOS, findings show reaching mandatory retirement as an O–5 at 28 YOS, 
versus retiring as an O–6 at 28 YOS, generated the most significant financial difference. 
The analysis then looked at possible incentives to continue military service while 
maintaining the same rank. The PV of the OSD retirement plan for an O–6 increased by 
four to seven percent per year for additional YOS. The annual increase is similar for other 
officer ranks. As would be expected, the PV of the OSD retirement proposal increases 
with YOS. It does not, however, provide a strong retention incentive for a force with 
service members exceeding 20 YOS—unless they anticipate further promotions. This 
raises the question for future consideration: What are the military future retention 
preferences and how does the retirement policy support them? 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This study was undertaken to analyze if OSD’s proposal would provide more 
value for service members than the current retirement system. With the increase of 
government spending and discretionary spending suffering heavy cuts, exploring 
spending has become an important topic. The single highest element of discretionary 
spending is the military budget. 
To be able to move toward a new future retirement policy, the concept of military 
compensation was addressed. One cannot change the current retirement policy without 
understanding how compensation is structured and the components it includes. Beyond 
the elements of compensation, it is important to have a deeper understanding of what 
incentive compensation provides to service members. After compensation was addressed, 
the report described the history of retirement reform. Reviewing major reform initiatives 
led to discovering what created the impetus for our current retirement system. 
Lastly, understanding the current retirement system is a necessity before looking 
at changing the policy. Gathering the correct information on what the current system 
offers and the different options under the current retirement plan allows for a better 
assessment of the value provided. Three retirement options, final pay, REDUX, and 
High-3, were examined. Each provided a different type of retirement compensation for 
service members. Understanding these packages provided a holistic approach when 
conducting comparisons. An OSD retirement reform proposal was then presented and 
analysis was provided to compare its proposed value to the current retirement system. 
Understanding each component of the OSD proposal allowed for an accurate assessment 
on whether or not it offered more value than the current retirement system. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the PV of both the current and OSD proposed retirement 
compensation systems for an O–5 officer, showed that OSD’s proposal would offer a 
more delayed annuity stream than the current High-3 policy, but it would compensate 
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with a one-time lump-sum separation bonus on retirement (at 20 or more YOS). OSD’s 
proposal provided more value for the service member. OSD’s proposal provided a net 
gain in PV of $9,391.27 over the current retirement system. With the separation pay 
increasing with YOS and the annuity streams becoming more equal, the differential 
between the proposed OSD and current retirement systems greatly increased with YOS. 
The next step was to see whether OSD provided more value for each rank and 
YOS—not just an O–5 at 20 YOS. Analysis revealed that the OSD proposal dominates 
the current system at each rank, providing a higher present value to the service member 
than the current system. The annuity disparities lessen as retirement age gets closer to 
OSD’s annuity age. With separation pay increasing with YOS, each rank was provided a 
greater monetary value than the previous. 
The final focus was on different ranks with the same YOS. Analysis discovered 
an anomaly at 28 YOS between an O–5 and an O–6: the monetary disparity between an 
O–5 and O–6 at 28 YOS was the largest until this was compared to ranks of O–7 and O–8 
at 34 YOS. Is this financial boost for an O–6 at 28 YOS part of a retention plan, or is 
there a detrimental issue in how payouts are structured? There were limited incentives for 
service members to extend their career paths if they remained at their same ranks. 
Understanding what we are providing service members should help drive how our 
retirement policies are chosen. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Studying incentives within the military retirement program is important. A major 
concern about OSD’s proposal is that, with longer time in service, less money is 
distributed. Separation pay needs to be carefully considered to understand the incentives 
provided to service members considering retiring. As OSD’s proposal is structured, both 
the separation bonus and the PV of the annuity payments increase with time in service. 
The incentives the military offers for YOS should reflect the current preference for the 
structure of the military. 
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